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PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY LAWS
Richard H. Hansen*
I. INTRODUCTION
The presidential primary, an experiment in democracy, has
been a subject of controversy since its inception fifty years ago.
Before using the past and present laws as a basis for endorsing
or rejecting the philosophy behind the primary, lawyers, legis-
lators, and political scientists would do well to examine and re-
examine the myriad laws passed. We should determine if these
laws have been successful in attaining the objectives envisioned
by the originators of the primary. It is the purpose of this article
to present a brief analysis of this question.
To understand the objectives of the presidential preference
primary it will be helpful to review its historical development
and to restate its general purpose.
II. HISTORY AND PURPOSE
Generally speaking, the presidential primary is the outgrowth
of a trend to broaden popular control of our governmental pro-
cesses. Because of the semi-aristocratic origins of the Constitu-
tion, this trend developed soon after its adoption. An early phase
resulted in the replacement of the congressional caucus, as a
means for choosing the President, by the national convention
system. In other areas property qualifications for voting were abol-
ished, negro suffrage became a reality and the movement for woman
suffrage arose in the 1860's in Wyoming.
The presidential primary had its immediate genesis in the
progressive era at the beginning of the century when broadening
political control resulted in the popular election of senators
and the general adoption of the initiative, referendum and recall
by states. In fact, it was the adoption of measures for the popular
election of senators which gave concrete form to proposals for
the presidential primary.
* B.S. 1953, LL.B., 1956, University of Nebraska; Member, Nebraska
and American Bar Associations, Association of American Law Li-
brarians, Assistant Librarian, College of Law, University of Nebraska.
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A number of states, chiefly west of the Mississipppi, worked
out a plan under which popular election of senators was attained,
to all intents and purposes, even before the adoption of the Seven-
teenth Amendment. Nebraska, in 1879,1 and other states during
the same period, provided that the voters of each party were
authorized to indicate at the polls which of the party senatorial
candidates they preferred, and the nominations thus made were
formally presented to the legislature. Usually that body was
trusted, without any special precaution, to execute the public
will by electing the designated candidate of the majority party.
In 1909 Oregon 2 and Nebraska 3 introduced a system under which
candidates for the legislature were asked to pledge their support
in advance to the people's choice for senator, regardless of party.
In either case there was, as with presidential electors, no obliga-
tion other than moral. Legally, the legislature remained free to
elect whomsoever it would, but the popular will was almost
invariably carried out.
Statutes of this type laid the groundwork for the state presi-
dential primary. Senator Jonathan Bourne of Oregon,4 Senator
Robert M. LaFollettee of Wisconsin, Teddy Roosevelt,5 and the
other progressives of the early 1900's sought by similar means to
accomplish a two-fold purpose in the field of presidential nomin-
ations: (1) to allow the voters to show their preference for the
leading aspirants for their party's nomination, and, (2) to reflect
this preference in the national conventions by the action of the
state's delegation.
This was the immediate goal of the state primary. Some
hoped that it would be "The origin of a new method of electing
presidents." 6  This has proved nothing more than a hope. The
real objective was to make the state delegations more responsive
1 NEB. COMP. STAT.,' ch. 26, § 9 (1881).
2 LORD'S OREGON LAWS, 1910, Vol. II, Title XXVII, Ch. II, § 3361.
.3 NEB. COBBEY'S ANN. STAT., ch. 16, § 5906xl (1911).
4 U. S. Senator from Oregon, 1907-1913. (Republican).
5 Teddy's illustrious fifth cousin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was one of the
"insurgents" who led the fight for a direct primary bill in New York
State in 1911 against Tammany Hall. The bill passed, in watered-
down version. See II, F.D.R., His Personal Letters, 165-166 (1948).
FDR's views on the national convention system and presidential pri-
maries were kept carefully to himself. Neither Mrs. Roosevelt, James
A. Farley, or Judge Samuel Rosenman recall hearing him express him-
self on that point. Letters and interviews with the author. Woodrow
Wilson not only espoused state primaries, but asked Congress in 1913
to establish a national primary.
0 Oregon Daily Journal, April 28, 1908.
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY LAWS
to the wishes of the people. It was a modest goal and one which
could be accomplished solely by state action.
The idea of a national primary soon followed.7 Its goal was
automatic nomination through the primary and abolishment of the
convention. Unfortunately, people still tend to confuse the goal
of the national primary with the simpler purpose of the state
laws. The distinction should be kept in mind while reading this
article. Treatment of the national primary is outside the scope
of this writing.
CHART I
LEADING CONTENDERS FOR THE
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION
1912-1956
Republican Party
1912 William Howard Taft
Theodore Roosevelt
Robert M. LaFollettee
A. B. Cummins
1916 Charles Evans Hughes
Elihu Root
John W. Weeks
1920 Leonard Wood
Frank Lowden
Hiram Johnson
1928 Herbert Hoover
Frank Lowden
Charles Curtis
1940 Thomas E. Dewey
Robert A. Taft
Arthur Vandenberg
Wendell L. Wilkie
1948 Thomas E. Dewey
Robert A. Taft
Harold E. Stassen
Earl Warren
1952 Dwight D. Eisenhower
Robert A. Taft
Earl Warren
Harold E. Stassen
Democratic Party
1912 Judson Harmon
Bennett "Champ" Clark
Woodrow Wilson
1920 Win. G. McAdoo
A. Mitchell Palmer
James M. Cox
1924 Wm. G. McAdoo
Alfred E. Smith
1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt
Alfred E. Smith
John N. Garner
Albert Ritchie
Newton D. Baker
1952 Estes Kefauver
Adlai Stevenson
Richard Russell
Averell Harriman
1956 Estes Kefauver
Adlai Stevenson
7 For President Wilson's message urging adoption of a national primary
see 51 Cong. Rec. 44 (1913).
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CHART II
STATE LAWS REVIEWED; NUMBER OF
POSSIBLE CONTESTS
Bearing in mind the years in which there were serious con-
tests for the nominations, state laws which were in effect during
thost years studied, and the number of possible contests deter-
mined and the number of instances in which all of the contenders
were entered.
No. Contests in
State and Years Law Possible Pri- which all contenders
was Operative mary Contests were entered
Alaska, 1955- 1 1
California, 1911- 13 2
Florida, 1955- 1 1
Illinois, 1913-1933, 1955- 9 2
Indiana, 1915-1929; 1955 6 1
Iowa, 1913-1917 1 0
Massachusetts, 1912- 13 1
Michigan, 1912-1931 7 0
Minnesota, 1913-1927; 1944 5 1
Montana, 1913-1927; 1954 5 2
Nebraska, 1911- 13 3
New Hampshire, 1913- 11 0
New Jersey, 1912- 13 1
North Carolina, 1919-1927 3 0
North Dakota, 1911-1935 8 2
Ohio, 1911- 13 1
Oregon, 1911- 13 4*
Pennsylvania, 1911- 13 0
South Dakota, 1917- 10 1
Vermont, 1915-1921 3 0
West Virginia, 1915- 11 0
Wisconsin, 1911- 13 1
Totals 185 24
*Complete figures not available from Secretary of State
III. PLACING THE CANDIDATES ON THE BALLOT
Have primary laws enabled voters to indicate their prefer-
ences for leading candidates?
The answer to this must be a resounding NO. During the
period since 1912 we have chosen nominees for the Presidency
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twenty-six times. In thirteen of these cases there were contests
for the nomination, i.e., an incumbent President was not already
assured of re-nomination, or there was not just one contender
with an outstanding lead, like Al Smith8 in 1928. Chart I indi-
cates the years in which these races occurred and the aspirants.
In these thirteen cases there were opportunities, between the
two parties, for one hundred and eighty-five primary elections.
These figures are shown in Chart II.
In all of these primaries we find only twenty-four instances
in which the leading contenders were entered. It must be con-
cluded that in the vast majority of states which had presiden-
tial primary laws in the period from 1912 to 1956, the laws have
actually frustrated the purposes of the state primary.
Primary laws have frustrated their objectives at the outset
interposing serious difficulties in the way of those who tried to
place the names of presidential aspirants on the ballot. What
provisions, or lack of provisions, in primary laws have led to
this situation? After fifty years of experience we should be
able to draw some profitable conclusions by examining the pertin-
ent portions of these laws and the proposals advanced to correct
the situation.
A. DATE OF THE PRnMARY
This can be a very significant factor in getting all the candi-
dates on the ballot. If the primary is held too early, all of the
contenders may not have announced their candidacies. Of the
twenty-four instances in which all of the candidates have been on
the ballot, four of the primaries were held in March, twelve in
April, seven in May and one in June. 9 We must also remember
the fact that these cases all happened in years when the major
candidates were known well in advance of the conventions.')
In 1912, for example, Taft," Roosevelt and LaFollette were all
early contenders in the Republican Party, while Wilson, Rep.
Bennett (Champ) Clark of Missouri and Governor Judson Har-
8 Alfred E. Smith, Governor of New York (1919-1921; 1923-1929).
9 March: 1912, 1920 N.D. Rep.; 1920 S.D. Rep.; 1956 Minn. Dem.;
April: 1912 Mass. Rep.; 1912 Ore. Dem. and Rep.; 1912 Wis. Rep.;
1920 Mont. Rep.; 1912 and 1920 Ill. Rep.; 1912 Ohio Dem.; 1912 Neb.
Dem. and Rep.; 1948 Neb. Rep.; 1956 Alaska Dem. May: 1912 Calif.
Rep.; 1920 Ind. Rep.; 1912 N.J. Rep.; 1920 Ore. Rep.; 1924 Mont. Dem.;
1956 Fla. Dem.; 1956 Ore. Dem. June: 1956 Calif. Dem.
10 1912, 1920, 1924, 1948, 1956.
11 William Howard Taft, President, (1907-1913).
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mon of Ohio were not exactly reticent in their aspirations for the
Democratic nomination. The trend has been away from the
early months, March and April.12  This is not only because it
affords greater opportunity to get all of the candidates on the
ballot, but because of the possibility of inclement weather in
many of the northern states.
Ample time must be allowed for canvassing the vote. With
one or two exceptions the conventions have met in June and
July, so the latest date feasible, allowing the secretary of state
sufficient time to count the votes, would be the middle of May.13
More primaries are held in May than any other month 14 and
the legislation proposed in the period immediately following the
1952 election favored that month also.15 A late study, made by
the Nevada State Legislative Council, suggests late May or early
June.' 6 There are two states which presently hold their primary
in early June.17
Nine of the 1956 presidential primaries were held in conjunc-
tion with state primaries, since the cost of holding two separate
elections is much greater.' s Only three states which have a
presidential primary also have a state primary the same year
and hold the two on separate dates.19 There is less inconvenience
to the voters and a better chance for a large vote When the two
elections are held together.
B. CONSENT AND WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS
Many states have required the consent of the presidential
candidate before his name can be placed on the ballot.20  This
12 Indiana, Montana, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and South Dakota have
all changed from an early date to a later one. New Hampshire is the
only state which changed to an earlier date and has adhered to it.
13 Since 1900 twenty conventions have been held in June, eight in July
and the two 1956 conventions were held in August.
14 Present line-up: March (1); April (5); May (8); June (2).
15 March (1); April (4); May (7); June (4); July (1); August (2).
16 NEVADA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL: THE PRESIDENTIAL PRI-
MARY, (Dec., 1958).
17 California and South Dakota (June 7th).
IS Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Dakota.
19 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Wisconsin.
20 The following states have had this type of provision at various inter-
vals: California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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is done by requiring either a declaration of candidacy on his part,
or consent to the filing of a petition by his supporters. Some
of these states also allow a candidate to withdraw from the pri-
mary if he desires.21 Others allow withdrawal, but do not re-
quire consent,22 while still others have neither consent nor with-
drawal provisions.2 3
It seems logical, if we are to get all of the candidates on the
ballot, that there should be no consent or withdrawal provisions.
Withdrawal should be limited, in any case, to those situations
where the candidate does not want to run for health or valid
personal reasons and is willing to say so. Of the twenty-four
instances in which all of the candidates have been on the ballot,
eighteen of these contests took place in states which had neither
consent nor withdrawal provisions, three in states with withdrawal
provisions only, two with consent only, and only one in a state
which had both features. 24 However, there were at least ninety-
two instances in which candidates could have been entered with-
out giving consent or being able to withdraw, and ninety-three
instances in which consent or withdrawal provisions were opera-
tive. It might seem from these figures that there should be
more cases where all the candidates were entered if it is the
consent and withdrawal provisions which are a bar to placing
the candidates on the ballot. But a further analysis of the states
which have not had these clauses shows that, with the exception
of California, they have all been states with a relatively small vote
in the convention. For this reason the candidates probably felt
that the small gain from winning did not justify making the
race. The really important states from the standpoint of voting
strength in the convention - Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio
and Pennsylvania - have had consent and withdrawal provis-
ions. It would seem that requiring consent, or allowing with-
drawal, has kept the people from having a real choice in the
primary.
21 New Jersey; Ohio.
22 Indiana, Illinois, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania.
23 At various intervals: Calif., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mont., Neb., N.H.,
N.C., N.E., Ore., Penn., S.D., Wis., Alaska, Fla.
24 No consent or withdrawal: 1912 Calif. Rep., 1912 Neb. Dem., 1912
Neb. Rep., 1912 N.D. Rep., 1920 N.D. Rep., 1920 S.D. Mont. Rep., 1924
Mont. Dem., 1912 Ore. Dem., 1912 Ore. Rep., 1920 Ore. Rep., 1912 Mass.
Rep., 1948 Neb. Rep., 1912 Wis. Rep., 1956 Alaska Dem., 1956 Fla. Dem.,
1956 Ore. Dem., 1956 Calif. Dem. Withdrawal only: 1920 Ind. Rep.,
1912 N.J. Rep., 1956 Minn. Dem. Consent only: 1912 Ill. Rep., 1920 Ill.
Rep.. Consent and withdrawal: 1912 Ohio Dem.
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Until very recently those drafting new primary legislation
have not been aware of the detrimental effect of consent and
withdrawal provisions. Of the bills offered in the period 1952-55,
five had consent provisions, six had withdrawal clauses, and
only one provided that no consent was necessary. A Texas bill26
provided for withdrawal only, on condition that the candidate
state that he did not want his name considered by the conven-
tion. The Nevada study, previously mentioned, recommended
a similar provision.2
6
There is no doubt that candidates use these clauses for polit-
ical expedience. It was a consent clause which kept the leading
contenders off the Nebraska ballot in 1952. If Mr. Truman had
stuck by his decision to withdraw from the New Hampshire pri-
mary in 1952, he could easily have avoided the humiliating defeat
at the hands of Senator Kefauver.
Granting the desirability of eliminating consent and with-
drawal provisions, is their absence from the law sufficient guaran-
tee that the name of a candidate will be put on the ballot when
a petition, duly signed, is presented to the secretary of state?
Not necessarily! There have been two court cases on this ques-
tion, and each came to a different conclusion based on the partic-
ular wording of the statute.2 7
Again, the mere absence of a withdrawal provision is no
insurance that the secretary of state will not accede to the wishes
of a candidate who wishes his name withdrawn.28  Therefore,
25 S.B. 2, 54th Leg., filed Jan. 19, 1956 by Senator Jimmy Phillips.
26 Supra, note 16. Sec. 30, p. 78.
27 McCamant v. Olcott, 80 Ore. 246, 156 Pac. 1034, LRA 1916E 706 (1916);
State ex rel. Kinzer v. Hall, 50 N.D. 708, 198 N.W. 770 (1924). In the
first case mandamus was granted when a Hughes supporter brought
suit to compel Hughes' name to be put on the ballot after it had been
removed at his request. The court held that the mandamus would
lie because the law provided that every voter should have a choice
for preference, and the vote was only advisory. The second case
involved withdrawal of LaFollette's name and the court did not
allow the name to appear on the ballot, holding that since the law
was intended to allow a choice among aspirants, and LaFollette had
declined, he was not an aspirant.
28 Secretary of State, Charles W. Pool of Nebraska, (1915-1919) in no-
tifying the signers of the Hughes' petition that he would honor
Hughes' wish not to run, even in the absence of a withdrawal provi-
sion, said:
"Exercising the authority which I feel I am warranted
in using, I have decided to follow the wishes of Justice Hughes
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a strong primary law should use mandatory language to require
the secretary of state to put the name on the ballot, and such
a law should also state under what specific conditions withdrawal
is to be allowed.
Certainly no one should be required to run for President if
he has valid personal reasons for not doing so. This person
can be given an out by the procedure suggested in the Texas
and Nevada proposals previously mentioned.29 A similar pro-
vision was embodied in the Minnesota law prior to its repeal.
No consent was required, but a candidate could withdraw if he
filed a statement that he would not accept the nomination.3 '
It is not surprising to find this section of the Minnesota law
the subject of a lawsuit. Estes Kefauver tried to withdraw from
the 1952 primary without signing the required statement. The
secretary of state, acting on the advice of the attorney general,
honored Kefauver's request and the Minnesota court upheld the
secretary's action, declaring the law unconstitutional. 31  The
opinion states that the law was "arbitrary and unreasonable",
and got down to specific reasoning in one paragraph where
it said:
Not only is the state attempting to deprive a citizen of a
private right and invading his liberty, but it is also attempting
to control the action of every other state. If a candidate has been
compelled to file such an oath as a condition of withdrawal, and
if, at the forthcoming national convention he receives the nom-
ination for the Presidency, it is apparent that such an oath on file
in the office of the Secretary of State in Minnesota would, to say
the least, be most embarassing if the nominee should wish to ac-
cept the nomination. If he did accept it, it can readily be seen
how the oath would handicap his candidacy. This .. . condition
... is arbitrary and unreasonable, depriving a person of an in-
herent right and invading the liberty guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment.
What is this private right of which the court speaks?
in this particular, believing that he, as a member of the high-
est court in the land, would not request me to do that which
was contrary to existing laws. Should you feel that I have
erred in this ruling, I shall be pleased to have you take it
before the courts of our state for final adjudication." Quoted
in New York Times, Nov. 23, 1915.
29 Supra, notes 16, 25 and 26.
30 MINN. STAT. ANN., § 202.49(2) (1949).
s1 Ryan v. Holm, 236 Minn. 189, 193, 52 N.W.2d 406, 408 (1952).
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Early in American legal history Judge Cooley wrote of the
"right to be left alone,' 32 and this has led to the recognition of
the tort of invasion of privacy.33 An examination of the cases on
this subject reveals that the tort is concerned with publication
of pictures and news stories.34 The facts of this case clearly do
not fall in this category. The Minnesota court defined "private
right" in connection with another statute as "some power or privi-
lege to which one is entitled upon principles of morality, religion,
law or the like."35 This could cover practically any situation!
Giving the widest possible interpretation to the phrase, as the
court obviously intended, it is still difficult to see how the candi-
date has been deprived of any right. Entering a state primary,
does not necessarily result in nomination at the convention. Even
if it did, the candidate could still decline. It is submitted that
the Minnesota court used the concept of "private right" to obscure
the real reason for its decision. If there is any private right in-
volved here it is superseded by a greater right of the public. The
objection to the primary law is really made on the basis of the
assumed right of the politican to exercise an option to run in
the states where he can win and avoid contests where he might
lose. Such a ruling may preserve a "right" for some politicians,
but it completely overlooks the interest of the public in the pop-
ular choice of a President.
C. FAVORITE SONS
When the name of a favorite son is on the ballot the people
are, in reality, denied a choice among the leading contenders, for
his local popularity seldom bears any relation to his real chances
of winning the nomination. Rarely is a favorite son a serious
contender for the Presidency. He is usually on the ballot to
"throw dust in the eyes" of the voter, and enable the state or-
ganization to send an uninstructed delegation to the convention.3
About the only hope these candidates have of securing the nom-
ination is to become a dark horse in the event of a deadlock.
32 COOLEY, TORTS, 29 (1888).
33 See 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
34 Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir., 1951). Peay v.
Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.C.D.C. 1948).' Gill v. Curtis Pub.
Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 231 P.2d 565 (1951).
3G State v. Pancratz, 238 Minn. 517, 57 N.W.2d 635, 647 (1953).
36 See Outlook, Ap. 5, 1916, for an article by F. M. Davenport entitled
"Failure of the Presidential Primary." On page 809 Mr. Davenport
speaks of the fatiure of the primary in this regard.
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Although the favorite son device can make a mockery of
any presidential primary law, it has been overlooked or ignored
in most of them. Favorite sons can get on the ballot in the same
way as any other candidate, regardless of the fact that it is
much easier for him to obtain the required number of signatures
on the petition. One way to obviate this difficulty is to require
a favorite son to obtain a larger number of signatures than out-
of-state candidates. If he is required to obtain a larger number of
signatures in each congressional district the situation may equalize
itself. If the favorite son is really a serious contender for the
nomination and not just a blind, then he should not have any
difficulty getting, say, three times as many signatures on a peti-
tion as an outsider.
State Representative Henry R. Heyburn introduced a bill
in the 1954 session of the Kentucky legislature which suggests
another approach to the problem.37 He would require the peti-
tioners to state that:
... we are entering as a bona fide
candidate; that we honestly seek his nomination as President; and
that we are not entering him in the interest of any other candidate.
It is unlikely that any favorite son candidate will admit that
he is not a serious contender. After his ego has been inflated
by members of his state organization he may actually believe
he is on the way to the White House. Proof that a man was not
a bona fide contender would be difficult in such a case, whether
it concerned the candidate, the petitioners, or those influencing the
petitioners.
The most realistic proposal is contained in the Nevada study.3 8
A native of the state may have his name on the ballot if he has
entered in any other state presidential primaries. This seems to
get to the crux of the problem.
D. WHEN No CANDIDATES ENTER TIM PRIMARY OR PETITIONERS
Do NOT ENTER THEM
The traditional methods for putting a candidate's name on
the ballot, i.e., permitting him to enter on his own or allowing
37 H. B. 453, Reg. Sess., 1954, introduced March 1, 1954. This bill was
the result of the research of Mr. Henry R. Heyburn of Louisville,
Kentucky, and was written by the Legislative Drafting Service of
the Harvard Law School from an outline furnished by Mr. Heyburn.
The final result, as might be expected, represents one of the best pri-
mary bills offered in the active period of 1952-1955.
38 Supra, note 16, Sec. 26 (1), p. 77.
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petitions to be filed by his supporters, have not been sufficient
to insure a full ticket. A good example of this occurred in the
1956 Nebraska Democratic primary. Adlai Stevenson did not
file as a candidate and supporters were not forthcoming to circu-
late the necessary petitions. Yet Stevenson and Kefauver were
undisputably the two main contenders for the Democratic nomin-
ation. With only Kefauver's name before the voters of the state,
the primary was virtually meaningless. Such a situation need
not arise.
Oregon has found a practical answer and enacted it into
law.39 The Nevada Legislative Counsel has recommended a sim-
ilar provision. The secretary of state is authorized, and specifi-
cally instructed, automatically to list on the ballot all candidates
for the presidential nomination who have been entered in the
presidential primaries of at least two or more states, districts, or
territories. The statute was further amended in 1959 to provide
that a candidate may be entered if the secretary of state "in his
sole discretion determines that he is actively seeking the nomina-
tion and such candidacy is advocated or recognized by news media
throughout the United States."40
E. WRITE-IN VOTES
Sometimes a candidate enters the race after the deadline for
filing has passed. This occurred in Minnesota during the 1952
primary. But because the law in that state permitted write-in
votes, the name of Dwight D. Eisenhower appeared in an elec-
tion for the first time. The huge write-in vote launched the
boom which propelled Mr. Eisenhower into the presidency. Har-
old Stassen4 1 and an unknown by the name of Settedahl were the
only persons whose names appeared on the ballot, and although
Stassen won, Eisenhower received thirty-seven percent of the
votes cast.42  The Eisenhower movement was helped immeasur-
ably by the write-in vote in several other states. In Nebraska,
neither Taft's43 nor Eisenhower's name appeared on the ballot,
but as a result of a well organized campaign, it was the write-in
vote which determined the election. Taft led with 79,537, Ike
39 ORE. REV. STAT. 249, 368 (1959).
40 ORE. LAWS, 1959, ch. 390.
41 Governor of Minn. (1939-1945).
42 REPORT OF THE MINN. STATE CANVASSING BOARD, March 18,
1952, Primary Election, p. 6.
43 Robert A. Taft, U.S. Senator from Ohio (1939-1953).
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was second with 66,078 and Stassen, the only candidate whose
name appeared on the ballot, received but 53,238 votes.44
This experience should indicate the wisdom of providing space
on the ballot for a write-in vote.
F. No PREFERENCE VOTES
Quite often a voter will find himself in the position of not
favoring any of the candidates on the ballot. He may have no
preference at all. If he is to have complete choice, some provis-
ion should be made for him to vote "no preference" and in favor
of an uninstructed delegation. Such a provision may be especially
valuable in years when there is not a strong contest for the nomin-
ation.
Governor Robert Meyner of New Jersey has commented that
... in the absence of one or two outstanding candidates,
primaries are a poor substitute for the convention system.40
This argument would not apply to a law with a "no preference"
provision. Then the voters could send an uninstructed delegation,
at the same time allowing those who favored the candidates
entered to vote for them. In the absence of a primary in the
situation mentioned by Governor Meyner it would be possible for
the delegation to be instructed for a man who was the favorite
only of the state party organization, not of the rank and file
voters. Even in off years the primary would help to maintain
a high degree of voter control.
G. EXPENSE FACTOR
It is impossible to know how many men have been deterred
from entering state primaries because of the expense involved.
Those who have campaigned extensively have found the cost
a considerable burden. Theodore Roosevelt spent much of his priv-
ate fortune during the 1912 primaries, and in 1955 Senator Estes
Kefauver was still paying the debts incurred during the 1952
campaign. 46  Those close to politics have been quick to notice
44 OFFICIAL REPORT, NEBRASKA STATE CANVASSING BOARD,
PRIMARY ELECTION, 2 (1952).
45 Letter from Gov. Robert Meyner to Richard H. Hansen, July 12, 1955.
46 A.P., October 18, 1955.
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this problem. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter says that
the present laws result in
... a premium on the spending of large sums of money by
individual candidates in individual states prior to the convention.47
Former President Truman comments:
The old saying is that any citizen has a right to Tun for any
office that he wishes, but, as a practical matter, he doesn't al-
ways have the money.48
Of course, the man who spends the most money doesn't al-
ways win, but as an article in the 1912 Omaha Bee suggested:
... one thing in this direction does stand out and that is
that a candidate who without the expenditure of considerable
money would not have attracted any considerable votes, can, by
liberal expenditures, make it decidedly uncomfortable for others.4 9
There can be no doubt that some well qualified men have
refused to run in the primaries because of the expense. These
men could conceivably be forced into the race by the elimination
of consent and withdrawal clauses. For this reason the expense
factor provides one of the strongest arguments for retaining
these provisions in primary laws. Instead of keeping features
which are susceptible to abuse, several states have tried to assist
the candidates in meeting campaign expenditures. This gets to
the heart of the problem by making certain that the candidates
will be on the ballot, while at the same time recognizing the
very practical fact of life that there is a burden of expense im-
posed on the candidate. However, these attempts have not been
very realistic to date, and have had little success. Some have
limited the amount to be spent by the candidates, while others
have provided for publication of a campaign booklet by the state,
setting forth the views of the candidates on campaign issues. All
these have proven abortive and most of them have been aban-
doned. O
It has been suggested that the government should advance
a certain sum for candidates and then forbid campaign expendi-
47 Letter from Press Secretary Emmanuel Goldberg, when Herter was
Governor of Massachusetts to Richard H. Hansen, July 13, 1955.
48 Interview with Richard H. Hansen, July 25, 1953.
49 Omaha (Neb.) Bee, April 10, 1912, p. 3, col. 5.
G0 CALIF. LAWS, 1911, ch. 18, § 10, repealed by CALIF. LAWS, 1915,
ch. 137; MONT. LAWS, 1913 § 5, repealed by MONT. LAWS, 1927,
ch. 126, S.D. LAWS, 1917, ch. 234, § 48, repealed, S.D. LAWS, 1921,
ch. 329, 333. The latter law also provided for at least one debate
among the contenders before the primary.
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tures from other sources. The late Professor of Political Science,
John P. Senning of the University of Nebraska favored this ap-
proach.5 1 Mr. Truman recalls that when he was in the Senate
this idea was discussed by Senators Norris and Hatch,52 and it has
been suggested also by Senators Smathers and Douglas. 3 Cer-
tainly the people of a state, through their government, have an
interest in the conduct of the campaign. If the people want the
privilege of voting for all the candidates why should they not
take steps through their state government to equalize the finan-
cial burden for the candidates? Although regulation of campaign
expenditures has been upheld by the courts, there could be some
serious constitutional questions raised by such a statute.5 4 These
should be considered carefully in drafting legislation.
The most common objection to this idea is that too many
men would try to take advantage of state funds. But a require-
ment of a large number of signatures from various parts of the
state on the petition would eliminate these undesirables, while
encouraging the good men to run.
An alternative suggestion would be that the public media in
the state, i.e., press, radio and television, be requested to give
equal space or time to each candidate.5 5
Whatever the approach, something should be done to avert the
danger that the primary might become a "rich man's game." If
51 Dr. Senning worked closely with the late U.S. Senator George Norris
(Ind., Nebr.) to establish the Unicameral Legislature in Nebraska.
52 Carl A. Hatch, U. S. Senator from N. M. (1933-1949).
53 George A. Smathers, U.S. Senator from Florida (1951-); Paul H..
Douglas, U.S. Senator from Ill. (1948-). Hearings before the Sub-
Committee on the Judiciary, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 33 (1953).
54 Opinions of the Attorney General, Texas, May 16, 1953, Reported in
DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Vol. 16, No.
33, 1953, publ. by Co. of State Governments 1313 East 60th St.,
Chicago, Ill.
55 Another approach was suggested by Senator Estes Kefauver, who in-
troduced in the second session of the 86th Congress a bill designed,
among other things, to limit the amount a candidate in a presidential
primary could spend. See S. 2436. The bill proposes a formula
(Sec. 208 (c) for limiting expenses, But in Sec. 208 (c) so many
exceptions are made that this purpose is largely negated. The bill
was passed by the Senate in January, 1960, but has not been con-
sidered by the House at this writing. While it is ineffective, the bill
is important because this is the first time either House has passed a
bill which would limit, in any measure, expenses in state presidential
primaries. Previous bills have been killed in Committee.
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the movement is to develop further, serious thought must be given
to this very real problem and some method devised to solve it.
H. REGISTRATION AS A SAFEGUARD TO PARTIES
If the voters of a party are to have a true choice among
the leading contenders in their party, they must be protected
from members of the other party who may deliberately switch
parties in the primary in the hope of nominating the weakest
candidate. Mr. Richard S. Childs of the National Municipal
League has prepared a Model Presidential Primary Law which
contains, among other worthwhile provisions, a section which
reads:
To qualify for participation in the Presidential Primary of
a party, the voter must register in the party of his choice not
later than the previous November.56
Most of the states feel that such a safeguard is needed to
maintain the integrity of the parties and have provided for a
"closed" primary.
Summarizing briefly, experience dictates that in order to
place all of the candidates on the ballot an effective primary
law should provide:
a. that the primary be held in May or June, preferably in
conjunction with the state primary;
b. that consent of the candidate will not be a prerequisite,
nor will he be allowed to withdraw except under certain
specific conditions; the law should make it mandatory for
the secretary of state to place a name on the ballot once
it has been duly submitted;
c. that favorite sons must obtain a higher number of signa-
tures on their nominating petitions than candidates from
out of the state;
d. that, if they have not already entered the primary, the
secretary of state should list the names of candidates who
have been entered in two or more state, district or territorial
primaries;
e. for write-in votes;
f. for no preference votes;
g. that the primary be a closed one; no cross-filing should
be allowed;
56 Initial draft, p. 5. Publ. by National Municipal League, 47 East 68th
St., New York 21, N.Y.
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h. for equal time and space to be given to all the candidates
in the papers, radio and television, and for public debates
if possible.
This is the hard core of the provisions which should be em-
bodied in a primary law designed to fulfill the original purpose
of getting all the candidates on the ballot.
IV. THE PREFERENCE VOTE AND
ELECTION OF DELEGATES
Once there are adequate provisions to insure the entry
of all the presidential candidates in the primary, the next problem
concerns the method by which the voter shows his preference.
The simplest approach is to list the names of the presidential
candidates on the ballot and let the voter take his choice. Few
primary laws have followed such a simple procedure, because
an important function of the primary is the election of delegates
to the national convention. The two functions, i.e., indicating
a preference and electing the delegates, have been interwoven by
a maze of statutory provisions. The result has been that some
sections of the law unwittingly defeat the purposes of other
sections. This will become clearer as we examine the types of
laws which have been passed.
A. DIRECT PREFERENCE VOTE
Under this approach the names of the presidential candidates
are listed, as are the names of the candidates for delegates.5
When this technique is used the voters are unaware of the pref-
erences of the candidates for delegates. As a consequence,
the voter may find that he has voted for a certain presidential
aspirant and elected delegates who favor another candidate.
57 (1915-29) Ind., Acts of 1915, c. 105, p. 359.
(1912-16) Mass., St. 1912, c. 254; St. 1913, c. 835.
(1913-15) Minn., L. 1913, c. 449.
(1913-27) Montana Session Laws, 1913, p. 590 (passed by initiative).
(1911 to date) Neb., Laws, 1911, c. 46, p. 216.
(1949 to date) N.H., Laws, 1949, c. 186, p. 199.
(1916-30) N.J., L. 1916, c. 41, p. 72.
(1911-35) N.D., Chapter 208, Session laws, N.D. 1911.
(1911 to date) Ore., Chapter 5, Oregon Laws 1911.
(1917-29) S.D., Session laws, 1917, c. 234.
(1915-21) Vt., Sees. 26 & 27 of No. 4, Acts of 1915.
(1915 to date) W. Va., c. 26, Acts of the Legislature, of 1915,
Reg. Sess.
(1911-15) Wis., c. 300, Laws of 1911.
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In Nebraska, with this type of law, many of the candidates for
delegate make it a point to announce their preferences through
the newspapers. If their candidate does not win the preference
vote, these delegates vote for him anyway at the convention.
This type of statute permits them to claim that the people elect-
ed them on the basis of the preference they announced before
the primary. One of our governors used this argument to influ-
ence the Nebraska Republican delegation to vote for Eisenhower
in 1952, although Senator Taft won the primary. The only defect
in this reasoning is that the average voter will not remember
the individual preferences of the delegates. He does not carry
a newspaper with him to the polls to be certain that he votes
for the right delegates.
B. DIRECT PREFERENCE VOTE SHOWING DELEGATES' CHOIcE
This technique provides for the listing of the names of the
presidential candidates, and the personal preference of the candi-
date for delegate is shown, thus:
John Jones
(favors Eisenhower)
Disparity between the preference vote and the preferences of
the individual delegates results under this method also.58 Though
the preference of the delegate is listed, confusion can ensue.
An example of this is discussed by Merriam and Overacker:
The idea, of course, is that the voters will then select the
delegates whose personal preferences agree with their own. Ex-
prience shows, however, that this is not always the case. The
Massachusetts primaries of 1912 furnish a good example of this.
In the Republican Party, Taft and Roosevelt ran t close race, and
the final returns showed that the voters of the state at large had
endorsed Taft in the preference vote, but had elected the eight
delegates at large favoring Roosevelt .... Where such conflict-
ing instructions are given, the delegate naturally follows the in-
structions which correspond to his own inclination.59
58 (1911-33) Ill., Laws of 1912 (Sp. Sess.) p. 43.
(1915-17) Minn., L. 1915, c. 372.
(1949-59) Minn., L. 1949, c. 433.
(1930 to date) N.J., Laws, 1930, c. 187, p. 819.
(1913 to date) Penn., Laws, 1913, No. 400, p. 719.
(1913-49) N.H., Laws, 1913, c. 167.
(1915 to date) Wis., c. 381, Laws of 1915.
59 MERRIAM AND OVERACKER, PRIMARY ELECTIONS, p. 151 (1928).
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C. INDIRECT PREFERENCE VOTE
These laws provide that only the names of the delegates
are listed on the ballot, with an indication of their preference1 0
There is no direct vote for presidential contenders, only for indi-
vidual delegates. Here there is still the danger that the popularity
of the delegates may influence the voting to an extent which ob-
scures the real preference for presidential candidates.
D. THE SLATE METHOD
California is the outstanding proponent of this system, which
provides that the names of the presidential candidates are not
listed.0' Instead, the candidates for delegate are listed in groups
according to their preferences for President. One mark consti-
tutes a vote for the whole slate.
Experience with this method has been highly unsatisfactory.
A substantial portion of the electorate can be deprived of a
vote in the convention by the operation of this system. The
1952 Republican primary in South Dakota affords a singular
example of this inequity. Slates were entered for both Taft
and Eisenhower. Taft received fifty and two-tenths percent
of the vote and by virtue of four tenths of one percent of the
vote cast had all of his delegates elected. Former Governor Joe
FoSS62 comments in this situation:
The margin was very slim and much discussion was held on
the point of whether or not it was advisable to have all the dele-
gates pledged to one man. The Taft slate went to the conven-
tion and supported the late Senator until the last ballot switch
of votes which gave the nomination to Eisenhower. There was
some feeling in South Dakota that, with the vote so close between
the two delegations in the primary, part of the delegation should
have been pledged to Taft and part to Eisenhower.6 3
The slate method deprived thirty-three percent of the Repub-
lican voters in California of representation in the 1952 convention;
and in the Minnesota primary that year the percentage was even
higher-sixty-six.6
4
60 (1916 to date) Mass., St. 1916, c. 16.
61 (1911 to date) Calif., Laws, 1911, Ext. sess., c. 18.
(1929 to date) S.D., Session laws, 1929, c. 118.
62 Joseph J. Foss, Governor of S.D. (1955-57).
63 Letter from Gov. Joseph J. Foss to Richard H. Hansen, July 19, 1955.
64 CALIFORNIA, STATEMENT OF VOTE, June 3, 1952.
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In spite of the California results, the Legislature of that
State has not changed the law since the 1952 election. The
Chairman of the Legislature's Committee on Elections and Re-
apportionment in 1955, Assemblyman Charles J. Conrad, states
an interesting argument for the slate method:
You have asked whether I feel election by slates is equitable.
My personal answer is emphatically, yes, so long as the present
method of casting electoral votes is in existence. That is to say,
since electoral votes are cast on a package basis under present
California law, no candidate is likely to receive any electoral vote
in California unless he receives a majority of the votes cast at the
general election and, therefore, it is equally logical that the dele-
gation also be selected on a 'winner take all' basis .... Delega-
tions made up of supporters of several candidates are not effective
on the floor of the convention and frequently find themselves in
a disadvantageous position, so far as the interests of the people
of their state are concerned .... California has frequently com-
plained that in the past it has not been given proper recognition
in either of the two national conventions . . . there have been
criticisms as to consideration so far as water rights, tidelands, con-
servation measures and the general welfare of the West. In such
cases, a split delegation has virtually no bargaining power on the
floor of the convention itself. Only by a united delegation able
to deliver its votes in a unit can recognition be obtained vital to
the interest of any large state.. . . There is a sharp divergence of
opinion on this and there are those in both political parties who
would like to see the delegates elected on a congressional district
basis.6 5
The method used by the Electoral College to count votes has
been criticized vehemently for one hundred and seventy-one
years. Historically, it was enacted as part of the same compromise
which resulted in the creation of the House and Senate. Prac-
tically, it has resulted in the election of five minority Presidents. 66
On this basis it cannot be argued that the Electoral College sys-
tem is an example of majority rule. Extending similar procedure
into the field of nominations is a multiplication of errors.
The strongest argument for the national convention system is
that it affords an opportunity for mixing all the cross currents
of public opinion. The slate system defeats this purpose. In
the South Dakota case just mentioned it deprived forty-nine and
eight-tenths percent of the voters in the state of representation.
Mr. Conrad very ably states, supra, the conviction that only
a united delegation is able to obtain "recognition" vital to the
interests of any large state. By "recognition" he may mean incor-
65 Letters from Charles J. Conrad to Richard H. Hansen, July 5, 20, 1955.
G6 John Q. Adams, A. Lincoln, R. B. Hayes, B. Harrision, W. Wilson.
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY LAWS
corporation of planks in the party platform recommending favored
projects. This argument can hardly justify the slate system. It
is one thing to adopt a platform and another to enact a law.
Platforms are famous for their attempts to placate factions. They
are often divorced from the views of the candidates.
"Recognition" may mean dispensation of patronage to the
united delegation which has "delivered" its votes. If this
be the case, are the delegates under a slate system "delivering"
their votes purely to insure the protection of the vital interests
of the state, or the vital interests of the delegates in the promised
patronage?
E. NEW APPROACHES
Bills introduced in the Nebraska and Washington Legisla-
tures suggest a new technique. 67 These bills, practically identical,
provided that a delegate must state his preference. The voters
would vote for both the presidential candidate (through a pref-
erence vote) and for the delegates as individuals. Election of
the delegates would be determined by the percentage of votes
cast for the presidential candidates. If one candidate received
fifty percent of the votes he would get fifty percent of the dele-
gates, chosen from those pledged to him in order of the highest
number of votes received individually. As a practical matter, the
formula by which the delegates were to be elected was difficult
to explain to the legislators. In spite of that fact, the Nebraska
bill failed of passage by only one vote.68 The Washington bill
suffered a similar fate.
Mr. Conrad, the California Assemblyman quoted above, noted
that there is a strong feeling that pledged delegates should be
elected on a congressional district basis. Traditionally, many of
the states have elected two delegates from each congressional
district, and the remainder at large. By pledging these delegates
it is possible to get a much better proportional representation than
by election of entire slates at large. Indiana and Montana passed
laws with such a provision in 1953 and 1954 respectively6 9 and bills
67 Nebraska: L.B. 260, 65th Leg., 1953; Washington: S.B. 26, 33rd Leg.,
1953.
68 Neb. Leg. Journ., 65th Sess. (1953) p. 1664.
69 Indiana: Laws, 1953, c. 143, sec. 1, last para.; Montana: Laws, 1953,
c. 214, sec. 8(4), referendum passed Nov. 2, 1954. However, the
Montana law was crepealed by aaws, 1959, c. 274, p. 676.
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with this feature have been introduced in Kentucky, Missouri,
Oklahoma and Tennessee.7 0
Former Governor Theodore R. McKeldin of Maryland,7 1 who
apparently has given a good deal of thought to the problem, says:
I believe selection of party delegates by popular vote is good,
provided they are elected in the main by congressional districts
rather than at large, so that all areas of the state are represented.
Selection at large would be acceptable in cases where states have
been awarded bonus delegates for party performance in past
elections .... 72
This trend is a definite step forward. There is, however, still
a chance under such a system for the popularity of the delegates
to influence the voter, even if he votes only for the presidential
candidate. This is because the names of the candidates for dele-
gate are still on the ballot. After the experience of the 1912
Massachusetts Republican primary7 3 it would seem wise to avoid
any conflict in the mind of the voter. The best technique would
be to leave the names of the delegates off the ballot altogether.
The names of the delegates would be kept on file at the office of
the secretary of state and a vote for the presidential candidate
would be a vote for the delegates pledged to him in that congres-
sional district. Thus, any chance of conflict between the dele-
gates' popularity and the preference for presidential nominee
would be removed. The preference would be clear-cut, the
proportionate representation narrowed, and the ballot shortened.
The voter need only put his mark by the name of the presidential
candidate favored.
There is another reason why delegates should not be listed
on the ballot. It would be necessary to list the alternates also,
unless the delegates are empowered to choose them, as is done
in some states. A ballot listing both delegates and alternates is
necessarily long. It is lengthened even more when the state
allows its delegates to vote half-votes. For example, Nebraska
was allowed twelve votes in the 1956 Democratic convention,
but it would have been necessary to elect twenty-four delegates
if the State Central Committee had decided to accept the option
given by the National Committee to use half-votes. Since, in
7, H.B. 437, Reg. Sess., Kentucky Leg., 1954, introduced by Cassius M.
Clay. H.B. 18, 1953 Gen'l. Assem., Missouri; H.B. 898, 1953, Sess.,
Oklahoma; S.B. 95, 1953 Sess., Tenn.
71 Governor, 1951-59.
72 Letter from Governor Theodore R. McKeldin to Richard H. Hansen.
73 Supra, note 59.
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Nebraska, the alternates' names must also appear on the ballot,
there would have been forty-eight names listed. Under the new
California law there is no need for either delegates' or alternates'
names to appear.7 4
V. EFFECTS OF THE PRIMARY ON THE
NATIONAL CONVENTIONS
The overall goal of the state presidential primary has always
been to increase popular participation in the choice of the party
nominee. Hardly anyone originally anticipated that it would
also affect procedural aspects of the convention. We turn now
to a scrutiny of the degree to which the primary has influenced
both of these phases of the national convention. For purposes
of clarity the impact of the primary on nominations will be dis-
cussed first, followed by a review of its procedural ramifications.
A. EFFECT ON PARTY NOMINATIONS
It is necessary to consider conflicting opinions on this ques-
tion. The first school of thought is that the primary has had no
effect on the nominations. The second view is to the contrary,
and there are some new figures to support this argument.
1. Indirect effect
Those who are of the first opinion usually place chief reliance
on one fact. A person can win all the primaries and still fail to
capture the nomination. Estes Kefauver's experience in 1952
is a case in point. The coonskin cap became a symbol of victory
in all the primaries that year, but when the delegates convened
it was nudged out of the presidential ring by a fedora with an
Illinois label. The single fact that winning all of the primaries
is no assurance of winning the nomination has often been used
as the premise for arguing that primaries should be abolished,
but the obvious answer is not always the correct one. It is true
that winning all of the primaries may not clinch the nomination,
but winning a few key ones gives a campaign powerful impetus.
This impartant reality must be kept in mind: The value of
any state presidential primary depends upon the caliber of the
opposition and the locale of the contest. To illustrate: With
the exception of the New Hampshire race against Truman, Ke-
fauver's victories in 1952 were meaningless. He was the only
74 CALIF. LAWS, 1957, Vol. 1, Ch. 932, p. 2143.
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candidate in many states, and in others he ran against men who
were not themselves serious contenders." Kefauver's real oppon-
ent, Stevenson, didn't enter the picture until after the primaries.
But in 1956, when Stevenson and Kefauver joined battle in the
crucial state of California, the results enhanced the prestige of
the winner and had national repercussions.
Under certain circumstances a candidate can lose a primary
and still improve his position. This sometimes happens when he
is a write-in candidate. If he is given overwhelming support,
politicos in other states will start getting on "the bandwagon."
This is exactly what happened to Eisenhower in the 1952 Minne-
sota primary, previously mentioned.76 Though he lost, Eisen-
hower's showing was so spectacular that his campaign gained
tremendous momentum.
The primary can eliminate contenders. The 1944 Wisconsin
primary destroyed the hopes of Wendell Willkie for capturing
the Republican nomination that year, and he subsequently with-
drew from the race. Defeat in even one primary, if it is crucial,
can take a candidate out of the running. Rejection in several
successive primaries in key states means certain political oblivion.
2. Direct Effect
It has been stated77 that the second purpose of the primary is
to insure a reflection of the preference vote in the convention
through the balloting of the delegates. The primary may not
make the nomination automatic, but if it influences the delegates'
voting it has accomplished its purpose. In order to judge this
effect of the primary we must look at the voting records of the
delegates.
The series of charts reproduced in appendix A, pages 509 to
527, correlate the preference vote with convention balloting. Dele-
gate reaction follows a definite pattern, depending on the number
of candidates who appeared on the ballot in the primary.
a. When the Winner's Name was Written-in
The difficulty with write-in votes arises from the fact that
the delegates do not feel that this method of expression repre-
7G For instance, in Nebraska he was pitted against U.S. Senator Robert
S. Kerr, (Okla.), who was a candidate only if Truman was not.
76 See p. 15.
77 See p. 3.
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sents a clear mandate from the people. This feeling is especially
pronounced when the write-in vote is small;78 and it holds true
even when it is comparatively large. For instance, McAdoo
received almost fifty-five thousand write-in votes in the 1924
Wisconsin Democratic primary, compared to fifty-eight hundred
write-ins for Al Smith. Yet only three out of twenty-six dele-
gates voted for him at the convention in the early balloting.
7
There is one major exception to this rule. It occurs rarely.
When exceptionally popular candidates, such as Franklin Roose-
velt and Dwight Eisenhower, are making a bid for the nomination,
a write-in vote can assume proportions which compels support
by the delegates. This exception is exemplified by the 1952 Min-
nesota and Nebraska Republican primaries, previously mentioned.80
b. When One Candidate is on the Ballot
There is no essential difference between a write-in vote and
this situation. Only one candidate on the ballot, muse the dele-
gates, gives the voters as much choice as they would have in a
Russian election. A. Mitchell Palmer 8l was the only candidate
entered in the 1920 Michigan Democratic primary and received
forty percent of the votes of the delegation at the convention.
The delegates' response was generous, compared with their reac-
tion to the 1924 Democratic primary in the same state. McAdoo
received ninety-nine percent of the preference vote, but none of
the delegates voted for him at the convention.
Widely popular candidates are an exception to the rule.s2
Primary winner Hoover 3 won the convention votes of the New
Jersey and Michigan Republican delegates in 1928; while Frank-
lin Roosevelt, winner in the 1932 Democratic primaries in the
Dakotas, also enjoyed the confidence of the delegates from
those states.
Even though he is the only candidate on the ballot a favorite
son will receive strong support from the home state delegates.
78 See ff. primaries: 1920 Wis. Rep.; 1920 Penn. Rep.; 1920 Penn. Dem.;
1920 and 1924 N.J. Dem.
79 See ff. primaries: 1924 Wis. Dem.; 1948 N.J. Rep.
80 See p. 15 supra.
81 A. Mitchell Palmer, Attorney General of U.S., 1919-20.
82 See ff. primaries: 1912 Penn. Dem.; 1912 N.J. Dem.; 1928 N.J. and
Mich. Rep.; 1932 S.D. and N.D. Dem.
83 Herbert C. Hoover, President, 1929-33.
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This is not a one ballot courtesy either. When the favorite sons
are men like Woodrow Wilson, James M. Cox 8 4 and Robert A.
Taft, who are popular in other states, the home state delegation
is always the last to desert his cause.8 5
c. When Two Candidates out of Three or More are on the
Ballot
Convention balloting here varies as much as human person-
ality. The delegate's individual interpretation of the primary
vote determines the way he casts his ballot, for the voters haven't
given him any clear instruction. It would be difficult to find a
better example than Hiram Johnson's 6 experience in the 1920
Republican primaries. There were three prominent competitors
for the nomination. Johnson appeared on the primary ballot
with one other candidate in Nebraska, Michigan and North Caro-
lina. He received only forty-six percent of the vote in Nebraska,
but forty-four percent of the delegation was voting for him on
the tenth and final ballot. Yet the delegates from Michigan,
where he received seventy-two percent of the preference vote,
were deserting him after the fifth ballot. And those from North
Carolina, where he also received seventy-two percent of the
preference vote, never gave him more than eighteen percent of
their votes. In Nebraska and North Carolina he ran against
Leonard Wood,87 a strong contender, and in Michigan against
Frank Lowden,8 8 also a formidable opponent. It is impossible to
account for the disparity in support. Delegates in North Carolina
were supposed to be bound by the vote at large and in their
districts; the winner in Michigan was said to be "the choice of
the people;" while the Nebraska law did not bind the delegates
at all. So far as these binding provisions are concerned, one
would expect the North Carolina law to have been the most ef-
fective and the Nebraska law least conducive to delegate support.
Yet the converse was true.
Here we again have the same exception as in (a) and (b),
supra. Extraordinary national popularity may compel the dele-
84 Gov. of Ohio, 1913-15, 1917-21.
85 See ff. primaries: 1920 Ohio Dem.; 1940 Ohio Rep.
86 Hiram Johnson, U.S. Senator from Calif. (1917-47).
87 Gen. Leonard Wood, former "Rough Rider", Gov. General of the
Philippines, 1921-27. 0
88 Frank Lowden, Gov. of Ill., 1917-21.
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gates to vote consistently for the primary winner. Franklin
Roosevelt is a prime example, as are Dwight Eisenhower and
Champ Clark.8 9
d. When All of the Candidates are on the Ballot
This situation differs substantially from the previous ones.
The voters have had full opportunity to choose between all of
the presidential aspirants. If the delegates choose to disregard
the clear instructions of the electorate then the primary is nothing
but a popularity contest. On the other hand, if they follow
the popular will, in these instances, the primary has fulfilled its
second stated purpose. History offers striking evidence of suc-
cess. It is so obvious it has been overlooked.
Presidential primaries with all candidates have been held
twenty-four times. A chart listing these primaries is reproduced
on page 500. The preference vote received by the winner is
compared with the percentage of votes cast for him at the con-
vention by the state's delegation. The number of ballots cast
before a candidate was nominated is also given.
In only four of these situations have the candidates received
a lesser percentage of votes from the delegates than from the
voters in the primary. Three of these cases involved unique cir-
cumstances.
At the 1912 Massachusetts Republican primary Taft received
fifty and four-tenths percent of the primary vote, but only forty-
four percent of the delegates voted for him on the first ballot.
This was the primary where Taft won the preference vote but
delegates-at-large favoring Teddy Roosevelt were elected. At the
convention these eight delegates, joined by eight other Roosevelt
men, abstained from voting. They did this because the conven-
tion had previously decided credentials disputes in other states
in favor of Taft delegates. If the Massachusetts primary law
had been drawn to avoid conflict between the preference vote
and the personal popularity of delegates, this situation would
never have developed.
89 See ff. primaries: 1912 Calif. Dem.; 1932 Neb. Dem.; 1932 Penn. Dem.;
1920 Neb. Rep.; 1952 Penn. Rep.
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CHART III
PRIMARIES IN WHICH ALL CANDIDATES WERE ENTERED
1912-1956
Preference Vote Convention Balloting*
Total
%by No.
Year State Party winner 1 2 3 4 5 Last Ballots
1956 Alaska Dem. 61 100 ------------- 100 1
1912 Calif. Rep. 53 92 -------------- 92 1
1956 Calif. Dem. 62 100 ------------- 100 1
1956 Fla. Dem. 51 88 -------.-...................------- 88 1
1912 Ill. Rep. 61 93 ------------------------------- 93 1
1920 Ill. Rep. 51 71 71 71 71 71 2 10
1920 Ind. Rep. 42 78 78 60 60 60 30 10
1912 Mass. Rep. 50.4 44 ..--------------------------- 44 1
1956 Minn. Dem. 56 0 -------------------------------- 0 1
1920 Mont. Rep. 61 100
on all ballots 100 10
1924 Mont. Dem. 91 12 25 62 87 100 25 103
1912 Neb. Rep. 54 100 ---------------------------- 100 1
1912 Neb. Dem. 44 75 75 75 75 75 0 46
1948 Neb. Rep. 43 98 87 60 --------.. 0 3
1912 N.J. Rep. 56 93 ------------------------------- 93 1
1912 N.D. Rep. 57 100 ---------------------------- 100 1
1920 N.D. Rep. 96 80 60 60 60 50 0 10
1912 Ohio Dem. 52 73 71 69 69 71 25 46
1912 Ore. Rep. 40 100 ---------------------------- 100 1
1920 Ore. Rep. 38 90 90 80 50 50 50 10
1912 Ore. Dem. 53 100
on all ballots 100 46
1956 Ore. Dem. 60 100 ---------------------------- 100 1
1920 S. D. Rep. 36 100 100 100 100 100 60 10
1912 Wis. Rep. 74 100 ----------------------------- 100 1
* Figures given are percentage of vote of whole delegation cast
for the primary winner. Thus, in 1956, Stevenson won the Alaska
primary by 61% of the vote, and the whole delegation to the con-
vention (100%) cast their votes for him on the first and only
ballot, etc.
In 1924 ninety-one percent of the Montana Democrats voted
for William Gibbs McAddo90 in the primary. When the conven-
90 Former Sec. of Treasury under Pres. Wilson, 1913-18.
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tion met, the delegates only gave him twelve percent of their
votes on the first ballot, but by the fifth ballot they were all
behind him; and ninety-eight ballots later twenty-five percent
were still voting "McAdoo." Though the delegates did not all
vote for McAdoo on the first ballot, they appear to have responded
to the primary vote as the balloting progressed. The fact that
twenty-five percent of the delegates were still voting for him
on the one hundred and third ballot shows that the primary vote
had impressed the delegates.
Senator Kefauver won fifty-six percent of the Democratic
primary vote in Minnesota in 1956, yet on the first ballot all the
delegates voted for Stevenson. They had originally cast their
votes for the Tennessean, but switched them over to Stevenson
when it became obvious he would receive the nomination on the
first ballot.
The special facts in these three instances support the argument
that the delegates will reflect the preference vote in the convention,
In the case of Massachusetts they paid obeisance to the primary
by abstaining from balloting. The Montana delegates did support
McAdoo when the convention got under way. The Minnesota
delegates supported Kefauver until Stevenson's nomination was
inevitable.
In the fourth case, the North Dakota Republican primary in
1920, ninety-six percent of the preference vote was cast for Hiram
Johnson. He did not receive ninety-six percent of the delegates'
votes on the first ballot, but he got eighty percent. Such figures
may not reflect proportional representation, but they do offer
strong evidence that the delegates were mindful of the preference
vote.
The delegates in twenty of the twenty-four instances listed
gave the primary winner a much higher percentage of their votes
than he had won in the preference poll. Looking at these cases
collectively it will be seen that the candidates received an aver-
age of fifty-two percent of the preference vote. The average
first ballot vote by the delegates for the winner was ninety-two
percent, roughly forty percent greater support than the candidate
had received in the primary.
The greatest individual variance occurred in the 1920 South
Dakota Republican race where Leonard Wood won the primary
with a thirty-six percent plurality. On the first ballot the state's
delegates gave him one hundred percent of their votes.
Five of these twenty situations arose out of the race for the
1920 Republican nomination. In the five states concerned the
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primary winners averaged fifty-four percent of the preference
vote. It took ten ballots to nominate Harding, but on the tenth
ballot the individual primary winners were still getting forty-
eight percent of the votes of the delegates from the states con-
cerned.
The 1912 Democratic convention took forty-six ballots to
nominate Wilson. The primary winners in three of the twenty
cases were involved in this race, and received an average of
eighty-two percent of the primary vote. After forty-six ballots
they were still receiving forty-one percent of the votes of the
delegates.
These facts leave little room for argument. The delegates
will support the primary winner at the convention if all the candi-
dates have appeared on the primary ballot.
3. Binding Provisions
The biggest misconception about primary laws is voiced in
the most prominent political circles. It has been stated repeatedly
by the nation's leading politicians in both parties during the
course of this research. Former President Truman succinctly
expressed his opinion in an interview:
Question: What do you think are the major defects in the
existing primary laws?
Mr. Truman: Well, they are not binding on the delegates...
Question: How do you think they should be corrected?
Mr. Truman: Delegates should be bound by some method,
but not indefinitely. How it should be done, I don't know.9 1
In truth, if all of the candidates are on the ballot in the pri-
mary, it makes no difference whether or not the delegates are
bound. As we have seen in the above discussion, in twenty of
the twenty-four cases where all of the candidates were on the
ballot the delegates gave the winners an average of forty percent
more votes than the candidate had won in the primary. . In most
of these cases the delegates were not bound at all, and in others
a wide variety of formulas were employed to bind the delegates.
Twelve of these instances involved states which had no binding
provisions at all.92 The delegates simply felt that they had clear
91 Interview with Richard H. Hansen, July 25, 1953.
92 1912 Calif. Rep.; 1912 Neb. Rep.; 1912 Ohio Dem.; 1912 N.J. Rep.;
1912 Ill. Rep.; 1920 fI. Rep.; 1948 Neb. Rep.; 1912 Neb. Dem.; 1956
Alaska Dem.; 1956 Fla. Dem.; 1956 Ore. Dem.; 1956 Minn. Dem.
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instructions from the voters and acted accordingly. The averages
of the primary and convention votes are quite revealing. The
candidates averaged fifty-five percent of the primary vote, and,
although the preference vote was only advisory or morally bind-
ing on the delegates, they gave the winners ninety-two percent
of the votes on the first ballot.
The remaining eleven cases involved states with assorted
binding formulas. In three instances93 the delegates were bound
to support the winner "to the best of my judgment and ability."
The primary winners averaged sixty percent of the preference
vote and one hundred percent of the convention votes on the
first ballot.
Three more cases concerned laws which bound the delegates
to the primary winner under a promise to use "my best efforts
to secure nomination.19 4  Two of the Oregon delegates to the
1912 Democratic convention switched temporarily to Champ Clark,
although Wilson won the primary. They were severly criticized
by their constituents."95 The average vote received by the pri-
mary winners in these situations was forty-three percent and the
delegates supported them with ninety-six percent of the vote on
the first ballot.
South Dakota in 1920 bound the delegates to the Republican
convention to support the winners for three ballots. This is a
commonplace formula, the idea behind it being that, generally
speaking, all nominations are decided in less than three ballots.
The mean of the total number of ballots cast at all conventions
may be less than three, but the average number required for
nomination has been twelve for the Democrats and four and
eight-tenths for the Republicans. The Democrats have taken as
many as one hundred and three ballots (1924) and the Republi-
cans fifty-three (1852). Mathematically speaking, there is not
much point in a provision which binds for three ballots. In the
South Dakota case in 1920 the delegates supported the winner
long after the third ballot. On the tenth and final ballot sixty
percent were still behind him.
The Indiana law in 1920 bound the delegates to a majority
winner only. Leonard Wood was a plurality winner, receiving
93 1912 N.D. Rep.; 1920 Mont. Rep.; 1956 Calif. Dem.
94 1912 Ore. Rep.; 1912 Ore. Dem.; 1920 Ore. Rep.
95 See OVERACKER, THE PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY, (1926), p. 73,
note 1.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960
only forty-two percent of the vote. Nevertheless, seventy-eight
percent of the delegates voted for him on the first ballot, sixty
percent were for him on the fifth, and although he had abso-
lutely no chance for nomination on the tenth and final ballot,
thirty percent were still supporting him.
There are other types of binding provisions in effect, and
several new ones have recently been proposed. One formula
would bind the delegates until the presidential candidate received
less than ten percent of the vote. This provision was first used
in Wisconsin and found its way into the laws of several other
states. Mr. Richard S. Childs of the National Municipal League
included it in his Model Presidential Primary Law.96
While it is a fact that few candidates have been nominated
after receiving less than ten percent of the vote, it has happened.
John W. Davis had less than three percent of the vote on the
first ballot at the 1924 Democratic convention, yet he won the
nomination. On the other hand, most candidates are out of the
race long before their share of the vote decreases to less than ten
percent of the total. Furthermore, if a dark horse should enter
the contest late in the balloting the complexion of the voting could
change so rapidly that the rigidly bound delegate would be unable
to change his vote. For example, in the 1852 Democratic conven-
tion the name of Franklin Pierce97 was not voted on until the
thirty-fifth ballot. On the forty-eighth the five leading contend-
ers had over ten percent of the vote, yet Pierce was nominated on
the next ballot. In such a case delegates bound by this type of
clause would not be released in time to vote for the nominee.
The ten percent formula is more popular than practical.
The bill offered in the 1953 Nebraska Legislature proposed
that delegates be bound until their candidate started losing
votes.98 The history of convention balloting does not support
the practicality of this method. Bryan9 9 and Harding'"0 both
lost votes between the first and second ballots at the 1896
Democratic and 1920 Republican conventions, respectively, yet
96 MODEL PRIMARY BILL, § 9, (1st Draft), see n. 56.
97 Franklin Pierce, President, 1853-57.
98 L. B. 260, 65th Leg., 1953, sec. 6.
99 William Jennings Bryan, Democratic pres. nominee, 1896, 1900, 1908,
U.S. Sec. of State 1913-15.
.00 Warren G. Harding, President, 1921-23.
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both won the nomination. Several nominees have lost votes from
one ballot to the next.'0 '
A new proposal would bind the delegates for one ballot.
They would then be released, caucus and then be bound by the
unit rule. This procedure is questionable since the unit rule
has been abolished in both party conventions. Another proposal
for one ballot would bind them and then allow them to vote
for any candidate who has received votes on the first ballot. 0 2
If the theory of representative government is to be extended
to convention activities, the delegates should not be so securely
bound to a primary winner that they are unable to exercise their
own judgment and discretion when it becomes reasonably certain
that a candidate cannot be nominated. 03 At what point can
this fact be determined? The history of convention balloting
does not present any pattern of voting upon which a realistic
formula can be predicated. But convention balloting does prove
conclusively that if all the candidates are on the primary ballot
no binding provisions are necessary.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing dis-
cussion. Winning the primaries does not insure automatic nomina-
tion. That is the purpose of a national, not a state primary.
The state laws have had an indirect effect in determining which
candidate receives the nomination. Presidential primaries have
strengthened the candidacy of some, and forced others from the
race.
The direct effect of the primary has been on the voting of
the delegates in the convention. We have seen that the degree
to which the balloting is affected depends directly on the number
of candidates who appeared on the primary ballot. In other
words, where the first purpose of the primary - giving the people
101 Highest number of votes lost on any one ballot from previous ballots:
Whig Party: 1840, figures not available; 1852, Fillmore, 8. Repub-
lican Party: 1880, Garfield, 2; 1888, Benjamin Harrison, 4; 1920, Hard-
ing, 7. Democratic Party: 1856, Buchanan, 12%; 1860, Douglas, 1;
1896, Bryan, 40; 1912, Wilson, 5; 1920, Cox, 30; 1924, Davis, 18. Sources:
See individual volumes of - PROCEEDINGS REPUBLICAN AND
DEMOCRATIC CONVENTIONS; STANWOOD, HISTORY OF PRES-
IDENTIAL ELECTIONS, (1898); MINOR, STORY OF THE DEMO-
CRATIC PARTY, (1928).
102 S.B. 2, 1953 Sess., Tex. Leg.
103 This was the conclusion reached by the New Mexico study in 1953.
JUDAH, PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY, UNI. OF NEW MEXICO, p. 23
(1953).
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a choice among all the contenders - has been met, the second has
also been fulfilled.
B. EFFECT OF THE PRIMARY ON PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE
CONVENTION
We have previously discussed the fact that the majority of
presidential primary laws now combine the direct election of
delegates with a preference vote. 0 4 Under the old system the
voters elected delegates to a county convention. At the county
convention the delegates to the state convention were selected. It
then fell to the state convention, three stages removed from the
voters, to elect the delegates to the national convention. 0 5 These
pyramidal conventions increased the power of the bosses. Since
they usually controlled the state delegation, the bosses had more
bargaining power in the traditional smoke-filled room. Direct
election of delegates helps to diminish this influence, but to what
extent is impossible to measure.
There is one obvious procedural effect of the direct election
of delegates which can be measured, but it has been completely
overlooked. No one has considered how direct election of dele-
gates has reduced the number of credentials disputes.
Credentials conflicts can wreck a political party. In 1912
the unsatisfactory disposition of the credentials contests led to
the formation of the Bull Moose Party. This, in turn, split the
Republican vote and resulted in the election of Woodrow Wilson.
Statistics from the convention proceedings indicate that states
which directly elect delegates still become involved in credential
disputes. However, the controversies arising in the primary
states are confined to one or two delegates at large or to con-
gressional district delegates. They have seldom involved the
whole delegation. A good example is the experience of the Ore-
gon delegation at the 1920 Democratic convention. The contest
arose over the filling of a vacancy caused by the death of Judge
Baldwin, who had been regularly elected. There were two claim-
ants, so the credentials committee followed the time honored
procedure of seating both and allowing them a half-vote each.
It is unusual for the whole delegation from a primary state
to become involved in a credentials dispute. It has happened
once. At the 1912 Democratic convention there were three delega-
104 See p. 21, supra.
'Or Two-thirds of the states still use this system.
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tions from South Dakota, all claiming to have been legally elected.
The facts showed that a Wilson ticket had been filed first in
the state primary, and a "Wilson-Bryan-Clark" ticket, favoring
Clark, filed second. Then, apparently to split the vote, a third
ticket was filed, which also favored Clark. When the returns
came in, the State Central Committee unofficially tabulated the
votes for the second and third tickets together. On the basis
of a very small number of votes, the Committee declared the
Clark delegates elected. They claimed that since the people
thought they were voting for Clark when they voted for the
second and third tickets it mas only fair to add them together.
The secretary of state tabulated the whole vote on the basis of
all the returns, and declared the Wilson delegates elected.1""
The Credentials Committee at the convention differed on the
question. A minority report urging the seating of the Wilson
group was submitted and adopted by a vote of six hundred and
thirty-nine and one-half to four hundred thirty-seven.1' 7
The statistics show that the direct election of delegates has
had an effect in reducing the number of credentials disputes.
Of the fifty-eight contests which have arisen at the conventions
since 1912, only eleven have been from primary states. 0 8
The method by which these disputes have been decided raises
the question of whether we should not now direct our attention
to an overhaul of the convention machinery for the settlement
of credentials contests. This problem is one for the conventions
to solve themselves. It was considered by the Special Committee
on Rules for the 1956 Democratic convention, but no concrete
action resulted.
VI. CONCLUSION
Primary laws have not fulfilled their purpose, except in the
twenty-four cases discussed. These cases are sufficient to prove
that the convention delegates, from states in which all presidential
contenders are represented in the primaries, will reflect the
preference of the people. The cases also demonstrate that binding
provisions are not necessary.
106 A humorous aspect of the presentation of the contest before the con-
vention was the unmericiful flailing given to the secretary of state, a
Republican, who was clearly the most disinterested party to the dis-
pute.
107 PROCEEDINGS, DEM. NATIONAI "CONVENTION, 1912.
108 Figures for the 1956 conventions are. not available at this writing.
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Experience and new techniques can be utilized to place all
of the candidates on the ballot. This is accomplished by the
recent Florida law and the amendments to the Oregon statute,
and will be furthered by the recommendations in the Nevada
study.10 9 By providing for slates elected on a congressional dis-
trict and an at large basis, the new trend in legislation recog-
nizes the need for correlating the preference vote with the elec-
tion of delegates, and reflects a new phase in the development
of the primary.
This new trend may be fleeting. States may continue to
disregard experience and to enact isolated laws having unrealistic
provisions that defeat one another or states may repeal existing
laws. On the other hand, the new trend may signal an orderly
growth. Such growth could result from a concerted drive for
the adoption of a Uniform Presidential Primary Law throughout
the nation. The Florida and Oregon statutes could serve as models
for the Uniform Law. With this accomplished the spirit of the
primary might ultimately emerge from the letter of the law.
100 Florida Statutes, sec. 103.101 ff. (1959).
Oregon, Chapter 390, Oregon Laws (1959).
Nevada study, see note 14, supra.
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